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WHO SHOULD BE AFFORDED MORE PROTECTION IN 
VOTING—THE PEOPLE OR THE STATES? THE STATES, 
ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME COURT IN SHELBY COUNTY 
V. HOLDER 
Tara M. Darling* 
ABSTRACT 
In June 2013, the Supreme Court struck down the heart of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 when it held Section 4(b) unconstitutional.  
The issue has now become whether there is a sufficient replacement 
for Section 4(b) to ensure that states do not discriminate against mi-
nority voters.  Section 3 may be a sufficient replacement although it 
places a high burden on the plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination.  
In January 2014, Congress presented the Sensenbrenner-Conyers-
Leahy Bill.  The bill will not be enacted as is because it is too strict—
it imposes greater requirements on the states than any voting rights 
legislation has before. 
Congress needs to gather voting discrimination statistics from 
the past five years to draft a coverage formula that will require only 
the states with a recent history of discrimination to obtain federal ap-
proval before instituting voting changes.  Voter identification laws, 
which are argued to be modern-day disenfranchisement techniques 
against minority voters, are likely to be struck down under the newly 
drafted coverage formula.  Under the new formula, the federal district 
courts and the Attorney General will have the ability to review pro-
posed voter identification laws and determine whether they will have 
 
* Touro Law J.D. Candidate (2015).  The author is currently in her final year of law school at 
Touro Law Center located in Central Islip, New York.  In 2012, she graduated magna cum 
laude from Manhattan College with a degree in Business Marketing and a minor in Sociolo-
gy.  She greatly appreciates and thanks Professor Jeffrey Morris for sharing his knowledge 
of constitutional law and for guiding her throughout this process.  She also appreciates the 
love and support that her family continuously provides. 
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a negative effect on minority voters; if they do, they will not be en-
acted.  The Supreme Court will not strike down the new coverage 
formula because it will apply current data to current times, unlike 
Section 4(b) and the proposed Sensenbrenner Bill. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were rat-
ified in the latter part of the 1800s,1 African Americans continued to 
face grotesque discrimination until the mid 1960s.2  In 1965, the Vot-
ing Rights Act (hereinafter “VRA”) was passed.3  The VRA was en-
acted to combat the inefficient and unsuccessful litigation that result-
ed under Fifteenth Amendment claims.4  Before the VRA, the courts 
looked at discrimination on a case-by-case basis long after it oc-
curred.5  The VRA prevented discrimination from happening in the 
first place because it placed jurisdictions with a history of voting dis-
crimination under federal preclearance.6  Federal preclearance re-
quired the state or jurisdiction to obtain prior federal approval before 
altering its voting laws.7  Almost immediately following the VRA’s 
enactment, discrimination in voting significantly diminished.8  Alt-
hough the VRA remained a key piece of legislation throughout the 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XV.  The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870. 
2 Timeline: History of the Voting Rights Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/timeline-
history-voting-rights-act (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  The major turning point for racial dis-
crimination in voting occurred when the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).  The House vote took place on July 9, 1965 at the 89th Con-
gress; 78% of voting Democrats in the House voted in favor; 83% of Voting Republicans in 
the House voted in favor.  All Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina 
representatives voted against it.  All but one Virginia representative voted in favor of it; see 
To Pass H.R. 6400, The 1965 Voting Rights Act, available at https://www.govtrack.us/con 
gress/votes/89-1965/h87 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
4 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966). 
5 Id. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1965).  This section is known as Section 4(b) of the VRA.  It sets 
forth the coverage formula. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965).  This section is known as Section 5 of the VRA.  It remains 
constitutional in 2014. 
8 Timeline: History of The Voting Rights Act, supra note 2.  By the end of 1965, an addi-
tional 250,000 African Americans were registered to vote.  “The Justice Department estimat-
ed that in the five years after [the VRA’s] passage, almost as many blacks registered [to 
vote] in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina as in 
the entire century before.”  See CHANDLER DAVIDSON, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief His-
tory in Controversies in Minority Voting, 21 (B. Grofman & C. Davidson eds. 1992). 
2
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rest of the century, it did not go without multiple constitutional chal-
lenges.9  Courts continuously upheld the constitutionality of the VRA 
because there were opportunities to decrease discrimination even fur-
ther.10  Congress also recognized the need for the VRA and reauthor-
ized it four times following its original enactment.11  In 2006, Con-
gress reauthorized the VRA for the fourth time.12  This reenactment 
was to extend the VRA for another twenty-five years, ending in 
2031.13 
In 2010, despite Congress’s recent reauthorization, the Coun-
ty of Shelby in Alabama brought an action against Attorney General 
Eric Holder questioning the constitutionality of the VRA.14  Shelby 
County requested that the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia order a declaratory judgment that deemed Sections 4(b) 
and 5 of the VRA unconstitutional.15  The basis of Shelby’s argument 
was that Congress’s power, under the Constitution, no longer extend-
ed so far as to allow the federal government to enact stringent voting 
policies upon the states through the VRA.16  Shelby also argued that 
 
9 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), reversed by Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder (Shelby 
II), 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Rome v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), reversed by Shelby II; Northwest Austin Mun. Utility 
District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
10 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301; Allen, 393 U.S. 544; Rome, 446 U.S. 156; Northwest Austin, 
557 U.S. 193. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
12 The Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 109-246 (2006).  The 2006 reauthorization was ap-
proved by the House on July 13, 2006 at 5:38pm.  The Senate passed it on July 20, 2006 at 
4:28pm.  The Bill was enacted after it was signed by the President on July  27, 2006.  It is 
known as the “Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.” 
13 Id. 
14 Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder (Shelby I), 811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011).  In May 
2012, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.  679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s judgment.   
15 Id. at 427. 
16 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2618, distinguished by BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, No. 1:13-
CV-76-RLM, 2014 WL 26093 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2014) (the plaintiffs brought into question 
the Common Council’s reliance on a combination of both old and new data to apply to cur-
rent times).  In BBL, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held 
that “[A] court isn’t required to re-weigh the evidence considered by a legislative body and 
doesn’t have the authority to substitute its judgment as to whether a regulation is the best 
option for a city.”  BBL, Inc., 2014 WL 26093, at *18.  So long as the legislative body relied 
on evidence that was reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem addressed, the data 
could be used.  Id.  (citing G.M. Enters., Inc. v. Town of Ste. Joseph, Wis., 350 F.3d 631, 
639-40 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
3
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all states enjoy equal sovereignty and the formula set forth in Section 
4(b) only applied to some states while exempting others.17  After 
Congress carefully considered voting discrimination into the twenty-
first century, it found that discrimination remained and minority vot-
ers still needed the protections of the VRA.18 
Subsequently, the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia held that it would uphold Congress’s findings from its 
2006 reauthorization.19  However, in 2013, the United States Su-
preme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the coverage formula found 
in Section 4(b) of the VRA was unconstitutional.20  The Court held 
that Section 4(b), although once necessary, had become outdated.21  
This decision meant that a state that previously discriminated against 
African American voters no longer needed to obtain federal approval 
before changing its voting laws.22  The Supreme Court held that re-
cent data showed that the jurisdictions that were subject to federal 
preclearance had not discriminated against voters in decades,23 and 
also had higher African American voter registration than jurisdictions 
that were not subject to federal preclearance.24  The biggest fear of 
the dissenters in Shelby, who were proponents of the VRA, was that 
states that were once covered would now institute discriminatory 
laws.25  They argued that this would result in a regression of the no-
table achievements that were realized through the VRA.26 
This Comment examines voting discrimination against Afri-
can Americans in the United States prior to the enactment of the 
VRA of 1965.  Section II will show that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments did not prevent voting discrimination, thus the need for 
a more comprehensive regulation was required.  Section III will ex-
plain the specific coverage formula under the VRA and why only cer-
tain jurisdictions are subject to it.  Section IV will address the Su-
preme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby, analyzing both the majority 
 
17 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2618. 
18 Id. at 2628-29. 
19 Shelby I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
20 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2628-29. 
21 Id. at 2630-31. 
22 Id. at 2631. 
23 Id. at 2622, 2625. 
24 Id. 
25 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
26 Id. 
4
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and dissenting opinions.  Lastly, Section V will analyze how discrim-
ination can be prevented by the VRA without Sections 4(b) and 5.  In 
addition, Section V will also show that the Sensenbrenner Bill as 
proposed will not pass and a new bill with less stringent requirements 
is needed.  Finally, Section V will address whether plaintiffs should 
bring their claims against recently enacted voter identification laws 
under their state constitutions rather than the United States constitu-
tion. 
II. PRIOR TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
Following the end of the Civil War, the Military Reconstruc-
tion Act agreed to readmit states to the Union if they extended the 
right of male suffrage to African Americans within the United 
States.27  Then, in 1868, to create equality among individuals within 
the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.28  It pro-
vided that no state was able to make or enforce any law that would 
“abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” 
and no state can “deprive any persons of life, liberty and property, 
without due process of law.”29  The Fourteenth Amendment afforded 
all male citizens of the United States equal protection under the Con-
stitution.30 
Two years later, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, stat-
ing that the right of citizens to vote “shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude.”31  The Fifteenth Amendment gave 
Congress the power to enforce voting rights, overriding states’ pow-
er.32  Although the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all pow-
ers not specifically granted to the federal government,33 including the 
power to regulate elections, the federal government can intervene 
 
27 Before the Voting Rights Act: Reconstruction and the Civil War Amendments, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro_a.php (last visited Apr. 
14, 2015). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
30 Id. 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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with states’ powers where an “exceptional condition” exists.34  If an 
“exceptional condition” exists, Congress is able to legislate where it 
would not otherwise be appropriate.35  Voting discrimination against 
African Americans was recognized as an “exceptional condition” 
thus Congress had the authority to legislate pursuant to voting dis-
crimination.36  Under Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Section II of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress was granted the 
power to enforce the Amendments “by appropriate legislation.”37  
Although the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified to resolve the dis-
crimination epidemic, it was ignored for almost a century.38 
A. Disenfranchisement Techniques and Successful 
Litigation 
Beginning in 1890, six southern states enacted disenfran-
chisement techniques that were specifically designed to prevent Afri-
can Americans from voting.39  “Disenfranchisement” is defined as 
preventing a person or a group of people from having the right to 
vote.40  This technique is often grouped into two categories—direct 
and indirect.41  Three of the most prominent forms of disenfran-
chisement techniques used in the South included grandfather clauses, 
the White Primary, and poll taxes.42 
 
34 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 334-35. 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
38 G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Former Judge Worked For Voting Rights, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 
20, 2013), available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/west/2013/01/20 
/former-judge-recalls-working-for-voting-rights-south/lKDPHI6Hrehok0XSApVaeP/story. 
html (recounting the experience of Judge Gordon Martin, Jr.). 
39 Among these states were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
and Virginia.  See Race, Voting Rights, and Segregation, Rise and Fall of the Black Voter, 
UNIV. MICH. http://www.umich.edu/~lawrace/votetour6.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
40 Disenfranchise Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disenfranchise. 
41 Direct disenfranchisement refers to actions that explicitly prevent people from voting of 
having their votes counted.  Indirect disenfranchisement involves techniques that prevent 
African American votes from having an impact on political outcomes.  See Race, Voting 
Rights, and Segregation, Direct Disenfranchisement, Techniques of Direct Disenfranchise-
ment, UNIV. MICH., http://www.umich.edu/~lawrace/disenfranchise1.htm (last visited Apr. 
14, 2015). 
42 Grandfather Clauses, Literacy Tests, and the White Primary, USLEGAL, INC., 
http://civilrights.uslegal.com/voting-rights/grandfather-clauses-literacy-tests-and-the-white-
6
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1. Grandfather Clauses 
Grandfather clauses were enacted by seven southern states in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s.43  In 1898, Louisiana adopted the first 
grandfather clause.44  The clause provided that only males whose fa-
thers and grandfathers were able to vote prior to 1867 did not need to 
complete written exams and pay taxes as a condition to place their 
vote.45  However, those whose fathers and grandfathers were ineligi-
ble to vote prior to 1867 were required to pass a written examination 
and pay a tax before they could exercise their right to vote.46  This 
technique, in practice, only applied to African Americans because 
their fathers and grandfathers were enslaved in 1866 and thus it was 
impossible for them to vote.47  Six other states enacted similar stat-
utes in the early 1900s.48  In 1915, the Supreme Court, in Guinn v. 
United States,49 invalidated all grandfather clauses, holding that they 
were “repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment.”50  The holding in 
 
primary/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
43 The Grandfather Clause, BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/grandfather-
clause-1898-1915. (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  States that adopted grandfather clauses in-
cluded Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Virginia.  
Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1915). 
48 Among these states were North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, and 
Virginia.  Id.  See also Grandfather Clauses, Literacy Tests, and the White Primary, supra 
note 42. 
49 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
50 Id. at 361, 368.  In Guinn, Oklahoma instituted a “radical change” in its voting laws that 
prevented African Americans from voting.  See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 355.  Oklahoma adopted 
a grandfather clause that required writing and reading requirements as a condition for Afri-
can Americans to exercise their right to vote.  Id. at 356.  However, Oklahoma allowed those 
whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote prior to January 1, 1866 to exercise their right 
to vote without meeting the same conditions.  Id. at 357.  The Supreme Court held that the 
substance and effect of the provision was an “open repudiation of the [Fifteenth] Amend-
ment . . .” because the grandfather clause “re-create[d] and perpetuate[d] the very conditions 
which the Amendment was intended to destroy.”  Id. at 358, 360.  The Fifteenth Amendment 
expressly prohibited a state from denying a United States’ citizen the right to vote based on 
“race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.  Okla-
homa intentionally chose the 1866 date because it knew that African Americans’ fathers and 
grandfathers were enslaved at this time and therefore no African American would ever be 
able to vote under this law.  Guinn, 238 U.S. at 357. 
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Guinn invalidated grandfather clauses in the six others states that 
adopted them.51 
2. The White Primary 
The second prominent form of disenfranchisement was the 
White Primary.  This was a device employed by white southern 
Democrats to prevent African Americans from exercising their right 
to vote.52  Historically, a one party system existed in the South until 
the late 1960s.53  Republicans did not run in the southern states be-
cause they knew that Democrats would prevail in every election.54  
By employing the White Primary, the state legislatures and Demo-
crats worked together to prevent African Americans from registering 
as Democrats and the primary elections were closed to everyone ex-
cept those who were registered as Democrats.55  In 1927, litigation to 
declare the White Primary unconstitutional began.56  In 1944, in 
 
51 See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 363-64. 
52 See White Primary, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/ 
white_primary.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
53 See Democrats in Decline, TEXAS POLITICS, available at http://www.laits.utexas. 
edu/txp_media/html/part/0401.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
54 However, the White Primary provided eligibility for all white males to participate in the 
Democratic Party.  See Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1944). 
55 See Surveying Party Politics in Texas History, TEXAS POLITICS, available at 
http://www.laits.utexas.edu/txp_media/html/part/0203.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  
Poor whites were also prevented from voting because they could not afford the poll tax ei-
ther. 
56 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).  In Nixon, an African American resident of 
El Paso, Texas challenged a state statute that barred African Americans from participating in 
any Democratic Party primary election held within the state.  Id. at 539-40.  Justice Holmes, 
writing for the Supreme Court, held that it was “hard to imagine a more direct and obvious 
infringement of the Fourteenth [Amendment].”  Id. at 541.  The Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires equal protection—Texas’s statute applied solely to African Americans.  Id.  However, 
Herndon was “severely limited in its implication” because Texas was the only state with a 
statute that explicitly excluded African Americans from joining the Democratic Party.  See 
Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Su-
preme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2001).  In 1932, the Supreme 
Court, in Nixon v. Condon, decided the constitutionality of the amended Texas statute that 
was invalidated in Herndon.  286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).  Following the 1927 decision, Texas 
repealed its statute and the Texas Democratic party enacted a statute that allowed a political 
party to determine the qualifications voters must meet in order to become a member of that 
party.  Id. at 82.  The same plaintiff as in Herndon was again denied his right to vote.  Id. at 
81.  The Supreme Court held that it would not decide whether the Democratic Party was able 
to require certain qualifications because a “political party is merely a voluntary association . . 
. [and] has inherent power like voluntary associations generally to determine its own mem-
8
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Smith v. Allwright,57 the Supreme Court outlawed the White Primary 
across the nation, holding that it prevented African Americans from 
exercising their right to vote based on discrimination on account of 
race.58  In Smith, the plaintiff was an African American man who was 
denied a ballot to cast his vote in the Texas primary election for the 
nomination of Democratic candidates for the United States Senate 
and House of Representatives.59  The Supreme Court held that alt-
hough Texas was free to conduct its elections in the manner which it 
chose, Texas could not act contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment by 
enacting laws that denied citizens the right to vote based on their col-
or.60  The Texas statute reserved membership in the Democratic Party 
to whites only.61  Therefore, the Supreme Court had no difficulty 
holding that a statute, which barred African Americans from partici-
pating in the Democratic Party, denied African Americans of their 
Fourteenth Amendment right guaranteed by the Constitution.62 
3. Poll Taxes 
After grandfather clauses and White Primaries were declared 
unconstitutional, southern states began employing poll taxes—the 
third most common form of disenfranchisement.  Citizens were re-
quired to pay a one to two dollar annual tax as a prerequisite to cast 
their vote.63  The states did not prosecute whites that failed to pay the 
tax; therefore, it was recognized as a discriminatory means to prevent 
African Americans, and also poor whites, from voting because they 
could not afford to pay.64  Of the few African Americans that could 
 
bership . . .” Id. at 83.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Texas Democratic Party 
passed a resolution that barred African Americans from party membership.  Id. at 82.  In 
1935, the Supreme Court in Grovey v. Townsend was faced with deciding the unresolved 
issue from Condon.  295 U.S. 45 (1935).  The Supreme Court held that a White Primary, 
when adopted by a political party rather than a state, is constitutional because political par-
ties “arise from the exercise of free will and liberty of citizens composing them . . . and are 
not the creatures of the state . . .”  Id. at 52. 
57 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
58 Smith, 321 U.S. at 651, 664-66. 
59 Id. at 650-51. 
60 Id. at 657. 
61 Id. at 656-57. 
62 Id. at 664. 
63 Race, Voting Rights, and Segregation, Direct Disenfranchisement, Techniques of Direct 
Disenfranchisement, supra note 41. 
64 Id. 
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afford the tax, many never bothered to pay it because they knew that 
there was a significant chance their name would never be placed on 
voter registries.65  Southern officials had full discretion to administer 
poll taxes.66  The officials would refuse to accept poll taxes from Af-
rican Americans that attempted to pay them or withheld poll tax ex-
emption certifications from otherwise-qualified African American 
applicants.67  Once the VRA was enacted, poll taxes were declared 
unconstitutional;68 however, the Supreme Court reiterated this law in 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections69 in 1966.70 
B. Continued Hardships on African American Voters 
Even after overcoming these three disenfranchisement hur-
dles, African Americans faced other barriers that denied them of their 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights.71  In 1957, in an attempt 
to register African American voters, President Eisenhower passed the 
Civil Rights Act (hereafter the “ ‘57 Act”).72  The ‘57 Act “estab-
lished the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department and em-
powered federal prosecutors to obtain court injunctions against inter-
ference with the right to vote.”73  The ‘57 Act was extremely weak 
 
65 H.R. Rep. No. 89-439 at 2446-47. 
66 Id. at 2451. 
67 Id. at 2452.  For example, before the VRA’s enactment, Forrest County, Mississippi had 
a mere 12 out of 7,500 African American residents registered to vote. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(a). 
69 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
70 The Court held that payment of a poll tax has no relation to voter qualification because 
wealth has nothing to do with one’s right to vote and therefore could not be upheld under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.  The purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is to ensure that citizens would not be denied their right to vote based on a characteris-
tic that had no correlation with one’s ability to exercise their right to vote.  The Court invali-
dated poll taxes, holding that “the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so 
burdened or conditioned” by such a tax.  Id. at 670. 
71 Often when favorable decisions were finally obtained, some of the states “merely 
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or . . . enacted difficult 
new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro registration.”  
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314 (citing dissenting opinion in United States v. Mississippi, 
229 F. Supp. 925, 966-67 (S.D. Miss. 1964)). 
72 Civil Rights Act of 1957, CIVIL RIGHTS DIGITAL LIBR., available at http://crdl.usg. 
edu/events/civil_rights_act_1957/?Welcome (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
73 Civil Rights Act of 1957, EISENHOWER PRESIDENTIAL LIBR., available at http://www. 
eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_act.html (last visited Apr. 
14, 2015). 
10
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because of the lack of support by Democrats.74  Therefore, three years 
later, President Eisenhower passed the Civil Rights Act of 1960 
(hereafter the “ ‘60 Act”).75  The ‘60 Act introduced penalties on an-
yone “who obstructed someone’s right to vote or someone’s attempt 
to actually vote.”76  Similar to the ‘57 Act, the ‘60 Act was weak; it 
added only 3% of African American voters to the roll for the 1960 
election.77  Under the ‘57 and ‘60 Acts, voting discrimination chal-
lenges were decided on a case-by-case basis where the plaintiff had 
to prove that a pattern-or-practice of discrimination existed in the 
state’s law.78  These suits took up to 6,000 hours to prepare; there-
fore, it was difficult for African Americans to find private attorneys 
to represent them.79  Luckily, the Justice Department was actively in-
volved.80 
Under the Kennedy administration, some progress material-
ized. President Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kenne-
dy, appointed Burke Marshall and John Doar to serve in the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice.81  During their tenure, 
they worked vigorously toward a comprehensive federal regulation 
that would not require going into each county and proving a pattern-
or-practice of discrimination, which often took years to litigate.82  
Shortly thereafter, the political climate throughout the United States 
drastically changed.83  By 1965, much of the nation was ready for a 
 
74 Id. 
75 Civil Rights Act of 1960 Signed, AFRICAN AMERICAN REGISTRY, http://www.aaregistry. 
org/historic_events/view/civil-rights-act-1960-signed (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 312-14. 
79 Id.; Justice Scalia, Voting Rights, and Racial Entitlement, NOTES ON A THEORY, availa-
ble at http://notesonatheory.wordpress.com/2013/02/27/scalia-and-racial-entitlement/ (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
80 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313. 
81 Brett Hoover, John Doar, THE IVY LEAGUE, available at http://www.ivyleaguesports. 
com/history/blackhistory/2005-06/princeton/john_doar (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
82 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 312. 
83 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was arrested in the spring of 1963 after leading a mass pro-
test in Birmingham, Alabama, which King referred to as the most segregated city in Ameri-
ca.  See Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr., Bull Connor, and the Demonstra-
tions in Birmingham, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, available at 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Civil-Rights-Movement.aspx?p=2 (last visit-
ed Apr. 14, 2015).  Following his arrest, Dr. King wrote his infamous “Letter from Birming-
ham Jail.”  In response, President Kennedy sped up the drafting of a comprehensive civil 
rights bill.  Id.  The bill was not passed until after President Kennedy’s assassination on No-
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comprehensive law that would prevent discrimination going forward.  
Between May and July of 1965, the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives passed the bill.84  The following month, the VRA of 1965 
was signed into law.85  Unlike the ‘57 and ‘60 Acts, the VRA was a 
law that could be applied uniformly across the nation rather than on a 
case-by-case basis. 
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
The VRA, although desperately needed, was a drastic meas-
ure taken by the federal government in that it required the states to 
obtain federal approval to implement laws that the states previously 
had the right to enact on their own.86  It has long been recognized that 
states have broad autonomy to determine the conditions under which 
the right of suffrage may be exercised.87  One of the most controver-
sial aspects of the VRA was its disparity in treatment of the states.88  
The allocation of powers between the state and federal governments 
preserves the “integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the 
States.”89  Almost all of the Voting Rights litigation arises under Sec-
tion 4(b) or Section 5 of the VRA.90 
A. Section 4(b) Coverage Formula 
Disenfranchisement was most prevalent in the deep southern 
states.91  In an attempt to control the states with the most severe dis-
crimination, the VRA provided a specific coverage formula.92  Sec-
 
vember 22, 1963.  Id. 
84 President Lyndon B. Johnson, We Shall Overcome Speech to Congress (Mar. 15, 1965) 
available at http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/johnson.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
85 Id. 
86 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2618. 
87 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965). 
88 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2624. 
89 Bond v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2634 (2011). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).  Section 4(b) does not require the plaintiff to show that the voting 
law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose; typically, these challenges are easier to 
prove because the plaintiff does not need to show intent. 
91 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-11. 
92 Section 4(c)’s first requirement was that the Attorney General determine on November 
1, 1964, that the state maintained a “test” or “device” restricting the right to vote.  Under the 
first element a “test” or “device” included four categories: 
(1) Demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any 
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tion 4(b) was recognized as a drastic measure because it treated the 
states unequally.93  If the state satisfied Section 4(b)’s two-element 
coverage formula, the state was then subject to Section 5.94  Section 
4(b) is a two-part test that requires both parts to be satisfied in order 
for the jurisdiction to be subject to Section 5.95  Before the VRA was 
drafted, Congress found that the use of tests or devices and low voter 
turnout combined tended to show that a “strong probability [existed] 
that low registration and voting [were] a result of racial discrimina-
tion in the use of such tests.”96 
Section 4(b) also allowed for the placement of federal exam-
iners in covered jurisdictions when the Attorney General had (1) “re-
ceived meritorious written complaints from at least twenty residents 
alleging that they [had] been disenfranchised under color of law be-
cause of their race, or (2) that the appointment of federal examiners 
[was] otherwise necessary to effectuate the guarantees of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.”97  In determining whether a federal examiner 
was necessary, the Attorney General considered several factors.98  
Upon review, if a federal examiner was required, his job was to place 
all that were qualified to vote on the eligible voter list.99  Each month, 
the list was given to state or local officials who placed the eligible 
voters on the official voting rolls.100 
 
matter, (2) demonstrate any education achievement or his knowledge of 
any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his 
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any 
other class. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).  Section 4(b)’s second requirement was that the Director of Census 
determine that less than 50% of the state’s voting-age residents were registered on Novem-
ber 1, 1964 or voted in the presidential election of November 1964.  Id. 
93 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. 
94 The jurisdictions originally covered under Section 4(b) were Alabama, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina and Arizona.  See 
Shelby I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 432. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). 
96 Shelby I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 432. 
97 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 320. 
98 Id. at 320-21.  First, whether the ratio of whites to non-whites registered seems reason-
ably caused by racial discrimination; and second, whether there was “substantial evidence” 
that good-faith efforts to comply with the Fifteenth Amendment were made. 
99 Id. at 321. 
100 Id. 
13
Darling: The People or the States
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
952 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
B. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
Congress, “not underestimating the ingenuity of those bent on 
preventing [African Americans] from voting,”101 carefully crafted 
Section 5 to encompass areas with the worst record in voting discrim-
ination.102  This section has a “bail out” provision to exempt jurisdic-
tions that can show they did not discriminate and should not be sub-
ject to federal review before enacting voting changes.103  The VRA 
also has a “bail in” provision that places jurisdictions under preclear-
ance that may have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on voting 
discrimination but that Section 4(b) failed to include.104 
1. Preclearance Review 
States that satisfied both elements under 4(b) were then sub-
ject to Section 5.  If a state as a whole was exempt from Section 4(b), 
a political subdivision that satisfied both of 4(b)’s requirements could 
still be subject to Section 5.105  Section 5 bars covered jurisdictions 
from changing their voting practices and procedures until a three-
judge federal district court in Washington or the Attorney General re-
views the changes.106  These two independent review processes are 
known as “preclearance.”107  The general idea of preclearance is that 
a state or political subdivision must obtain prior federal approval be-
fore implementing voting changes. 
If the covered jurisdiction submits its proposed change to the 
United States Attorney General, the covered jurisdiction bears the 
burden of proving: (1) there is no discriminatory purpose for the pro-
posed change; and (2) if the change is implemented, it will not ad-
versely affect the voting rights of minority voters.108  The Attorney 
 
101 Allen, 393 U.S. at 548. 
102 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2625. 
103 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(3). 
105 United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield Ala., 435 U.S. 110, 112-13 (1978). 
106 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro_b.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
107 Review by the federal district court is known as “judicial preclearance”; whereas re-
view by the Attorney General is known as “administrative preclearance.”  Id. 
108 Brian L. Porto, Annotation, What Changes in Voting Practices or Procedures Must be 
Precleared Under § 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c)—Supreme Court 
Cases, 146 A.L.R. FED. 619 (1998). 
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General has sixty days to respond to the covered jurisdiction’s pro-
posal.109  If he fails to respond, the change may be implemented as 
proposed; if he denies the proposal, the covered jurisdiction may not 
implement the change—his decision is not subject to judicial re-
view.110  If the covered jurisdiction fails to obtain preclearance and 
institutes the change, a private party who is injured by the change can 
bring an action for a declaratory judgment to determine that the 
change is subject to preclearance.111 
The second method of obtaining preclearance is to file a peti-
tion for a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.112  A three-judge panel reviews the pro-
posed change de novo and determines whether the change would be 
racially discriminatory in either purpose or effect.113  If the covered 
jurisdiction does not prevail, it may appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court.114 
2. “Bailing Out” and “Bailing In” 
Jurisdictions that were originally subject to Sections 4(b) and 
5 have the ability to “bail out” of coverage if they can satisfy various 
requirements.115  The applicant, who is either a state or political sub-
division of the state, must prove that six specific violations did not 
occur in the past ten years from the date of the “bail out” applica-
tion.116  If the applicant makes a successful showing, the covered ju-
 
109 Allen, 393 U.S. at 549. 
110 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). 
111 Allen, 393 U.S. at 549-50. 
112 Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 519 U.S. 9, 12 (1996). 
113 Cnty. Council of Sumter Cnty., S.C. v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694, 706 (D.D.C. 
1983). 
114 Id. at 696. 
115 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)-(F).  The first violation is that no test or device was used 
for the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.  Id. at § 
(A).  Second, there was no final judgment in any part of the state that determined that there 
was a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on the account of race or color.  Id. at § (B).  
Third, no federal examiner was assigned within the state.  Id. at § (C).  Fourth, the state and 
all of its political subdivisions, including governmental units complied with Section 5.  Id. at 
§ (D).  Fifth, the Attorney General did not interpose any objection and no declaratory judg-
ment was denied; and there are no declaratory judgments pending.  42 U.S.C. § 
1973b(a)(1)(E).  Finally, the sixth is that the state has: (1) eliminated voting procedures and 
methods that dilute equal access to the electoral process; (2) have engaged in constructive 
efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of people who are protected under the Act; 
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risdiction is no longer subject to Section 5 coverage and does not 
need federal approval before it implements voting changes.117  The 
“bail out” mechanism was included in the VRA because Congress re-
alized that Section 4(b)’s formula could be over-inclusive by placing 
jurisdictions that had no voting discrimination under preclearance.118 
Congress also realized that Section 4(b)’s formula could be 
under-inclusive, so it created the “bail in” mechanism.119  “Bailing 
in,” also referred to as the “pocket trigger,” authorizes federal district 
courts to place states and political subdivisions that have violated the 
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments under Section 4(b).120  The 
“pocket trigger” is found in Section 3 of the VRA.121  It finds “pock-
ets of discrimination”122 that were not originally covered by Section 
4(b).123  For example, if a state that is not subject to federal preclear-
ance intentionally discriminates by enacting a voting law, the district 
court has the authority to place the state under Section 4(b), requiring 
that any voting change going forward must comply with the federal 
preclearance process.124  Under Section 3, “district court[s] [have] the 
discretion to determine how long the jurisdiction will remain bailed-
in.”125 
3. Private Right to Institute Suit 
Under Section 5 of the VRA, the Attorney General has the au-
thority to institute an action against the state or political subdivision 
when it changes its voting laws without federal preclearance.126  
Congress feared that the “laudable goal” of the VRA could be “se-
verely hampered” if African Americans who were harmed had to wait 
 
and (3) have engaged in other constructive efforts, such as convenience to expand the oppor-
tunity for registration of all people who are of voting age and entitled to vote and have ap-
pointed minority persons as election officials.  Id. at § (F). 
117 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)-(F). 
118 Id. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). 
120 Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and 
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010). 
121 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). 
122 Crum, supra note 120, at 1997. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 2017. 
125 Id. at 2008. 
126 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 554, 556-57 (1969). 
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until the Attorney General brought an action in order to secure re-
lief.127  Therefore, the Supreme Court held in Allen v. State Board of 
Elections128 that the holding in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak129 should ex-
tend to this case.130  In Borak, the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allowed private citizens 
to bring a cause of action.131  The Supreme Court held that the ‘34 
Act “while . . . [making] no specific reference to a private right of ac-
tion, among its chief purposes [was] the ‘protection of investors’ 
which certainly [implied] the availability of judicial relief where nec-
essary to achieve that result.”132  The Supreme Court held that a simi-
lar analysis was applicable in Allen because Section 5 “might well 
prove an empty promise unless private citizens were allowed to seek 
judicial enforcement of the prohibition.”133  The Supreme Court fur-
ther held in Allen that the private right to sue under the VRA only ap-
plied to declaratory judgment actions.134  This meant that the only 
remedy available for a private individual was for the court to declare 
the state’s new law invalid because the state failed to obtain prior 
federal approval. 
4. The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act 
Questioned after Congress’s Reauthorizations 
of the Act 
In 1966, just one year after the VRA was passed, South Caro-
lina questioned Congress’s authority to enact such a statute.135  In 
Katzenbach, South Carolina argued that Congress only had the au-
thority to forbid Fifteenth Amendment violations in general terms, 
not through the use of specific remedies.136  The Court disagreed and 
held that Congress’s power “is complete in itself, [and] may be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 544. 
129 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
130 Allen, 393 U.S. at 558. 
131 Borak, 377 U.S. at 430-31. 
132 Id. at 432. 
133 Allen, 393 U.S. at 557. 
134 Id. at 559. 
135 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307. 
136 Id. at 327. 
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than are prescribed in the constitution.”137  Applying Congress’s 
power to the coverage formula set forth in Section 4(b), the Court 
found that all of the jurisdictions were appropriately subjected to the 
VRA because there was evidence of recent voting discrimination.138  
Despite its constitutional challenges, Congress reauthorized and 
amended the VRA four times after its institution in 1965.139  Original-
ly, it was intended to be a temporary solution to voting discrimination 
and was designed to last for only five years.140  However, Congress 
recognized that the VRA was still necessary after the initial five-year 
period and it reauthorized it for the first time in 1970.141  In 1975, it 
was reauthorized again, this time for seven years.142 
Following the 1975 reauthorization, the city of Rome located 
in the state of Georgia challenged the constitutionality of the VRA.143  
Georgia, as well as its political subdivisions, were covered jurisdic-
tions under the VRA and were therefore required to obtain federal 
preclearance;144 however, the City of Rome failed to do so.145  Rome 
argued that Section 5 went beyond Congress’s power under the Fif-
teenth Amendment because Section 5 also prohibited unintentional 
discrimination in voting.146  The Supreme Court disagreed with 
Rome’s argument and “held that Congress reasonably concluded that 
it was appropriate to prohibit changes that had a discriminatory ef-
fect,”147 even if the purpose of the voting change was not discrimina-
tory.  Rome also challenged the VRA when it argued that Section 5 
 
137 Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)). 
138 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329-30. 
139 The Voting Rights Act, supra note 99. 
140 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110 (79 Stat.) 438 (1965). 
141 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285 (84 Stat.) 314 (1970). 
142 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-73 (89 Stat. 400) (1975).  The 
1970 and 1975 reauthorizations amended Section 5 coverage to include political subdivi-
sions of states that were not originally covered, including Alaska, Arizona, Texas, and parts 
of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota.  See Shelby 
II, 133 S. Ct. at 2620.  The 1975 reauthorization also amended the definition of “test” or 
“device” to include the practice of providing bilingual reading materials in jurisdictions 
where over 5% of the voting-age citizens spoke a language other than English.  Id. 
143 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 159 (1980). 
144 Id. at 161. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 173. 
147 Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: 
How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 386, 
397 (2008). 
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outlived its usefulness.148  The Supreme Court also rejected this 
claim—it held that the Court was to grant extreme deference to Con-
gress’s findings when it reauthorized the VRA in 1975.149  The Su-
preme Court further held that “only a dramatic change of factual cir-
cumstances in the covered jurisdictions would warrant a rejection of 
Congress’s choice to renew and extend the preclearance provi-
sion.”150 
In 1982, the VRA was reauthorized for an additional twenty-
five years.151  The 1982 reauthorization created a “bail out” option 
where covered jurisdictions, through various showings, could termi-
nate their coverage under Section 4(b).152  Also in 1982, Congress 
removed the requirement that a plaintiff needed to prove a “discrimi-
natory purpose.”153  This meant that the plaintiff would prevail if he 
could prove that there was no intent to discriminate, but that the vot-
ing change had a discriminatory effect.154 
The last reauthorization, in 2006, extended the VRA for an 
additional twenty-five years, to end in 2031.155  In 2003, the Supreme 
Court decided Georgia v. Ashcroft.156  According to Ashcroft, prior to 
the 2006 reauthorization, Congress’s method for assessing whether a 
voting change violated Section 5 was whether the ability of minority 
groups to participate in the political process and to elect their candi-
date of choice to office was diminished.157  The Supreme Court’s 
holding in Ashcroft eliminated the method that looked at the dimin-
ished ability of minority voters to participate in the political process 
 
148 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-81. 
149 Clarke, supra note 147, at 397-398. 
150 Clarke, supra note 147, at 398. 
151 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205 § 1 (96 Stat. 131, 133) 
(1982). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 131-32. 
154 Id. 
155 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2621. 
156 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003). 
157 In Ashcroft, Georgia sought to redistrict its State Senate Plan.  Id. at 465.  Georgia was 
considered a covered jurisdiction and was thus subject to preclearance.  Id. at 466.  Georgia 
had the burden to show that the proposed change was non-retrogressive.  Id. at 468 (citing 
Johnson v Miller, 929 F. Supp 1529, 1539-40 (1996)).  Georgia submitted a detailed plan 
that included the population in each district, “the total black population, the black voting age 
population, the percentage of black registered voters, and the overall percentage of Demo-
cratic votes.”  Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472.  The government argued that the proposed change 
diminished the ability of black voters to elect candidates of their choice.  Id. 
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and instituted a new method.158  The new method was a less rigid to-
tality of the circumstances approach that examined retrogressive ef-
fects by looking at all relevant circumstances.159  Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court made it clear that Georgia satisfied its burden by 
proving that the proposed changes had no retrogressive effect on mi-
nority voters, but remanded the case to the district court so that it 
could reweigh the facts.160 
When the VRA was being considered for reauthorization in 
2006, Congress considered the recent test set out in Ashcroft and 
found the test to be ambiguous.161  Upon its determination, Congress 
added language stating that all voting changes that diminished the 
ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates of choice 
should be denied under preclearance pursuant to Section 5.162  Over-
all, Congress found that the congressional records demonstrated that 
“without the continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protec-
tions, racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of the 
opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes di-
luted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the 
last 40 years.”163  Thus, Congress extended the VRA until 2031.164 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
REVISITED 
Following Congress’s fourth reauthorization of the VRA in 
2006, Congress’s authority to enforce the VRA was almost immedi-
ately challenged as unconstitutional.165  The Supreme Court strongly 
suggested that Section 5 was unconstitutional in Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder,166 but did not ultimately 
 
158 Id. at 479. 
159 Id. at 479-80.  Relevant circumstances included the ability of minority groups to elect 
their candidate of choice, the feasibility of a non-retrogressive plan, and the extent of the mi-
nority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process.  Id. 
160 Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 490. 
161 Shelby I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38. 
162 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246 § 1, (120 Stat. 577, 580-81) (2006). 
163 Id. at 578. 
164 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2621. 
165 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 196 (2009). 
166 The plaintiff in Northwest Austin was a small utility district located in Texas; Texas 
was a covered jurisdiction.  Id. at 196.  The utility district sought to “bail out” from preclear-
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reach that position until 2013 in Shelby County v. Holder167 when it 
struck down Section 4(b), which in turn rendered Section 5 useless.168 
A. Shelby County v. Holder: Section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act was Held Unconstitutional in 2013 
Although the Supreme Court previously chose not to decide 
whether the VRA remained constitutional in the twenty-first century, 
the Supreme Court could no longer avoid addressing this difficult 
question when it granted certiorari to hear Shelby County v. Holder in 
2013.169  In its decision, the Supreme Court issued the holding that 
many VRA proponents feared—Section 4(b) of the VRA was uncon-
stitutional.170  For those who felt like this result was a long time com-
ing, they were satisfied that the Supreme Court declined to continue 
the application of decade-old data to current times. 
1. Procedural History in Shelby 
The petitioner in Shelby was Shelby County located in the 
covered jurisdiction of Alabama.171  In 2010, Shelby County sought a 
 
ance because it had no history of voting discrimination.  Id. at 197.  The district court found 
that Section 5 was constitutional because Congress rationally concluded that it was necessary 
to protect minorities in voting and because “the 2006 Amendment qualifie[d] as a congruent 
and proportional response to the continuing problem of racial discrimination in voting that 
Congress sought to remedy.”  Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One. v. Mukasey, 573 F. 
Supp. 2d 221, 283 (2008).  The Supreme Court, when it determined whether Section 5 was 
still constitutional, noted that the registration gap between African Americans and whites in 
covered jurisdictions was in the single digits and some covered jurisdictions had higher voter 
registration rates for African Americans than for whites.  See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 201.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court questioned whether legislation that was more than thirty-
five years old could be applied to current times.  Id. at 203.  Although the Supreme Court did 
not deem Section 5 unconstitutional, it provided the necessary requirement to justify dispar-
ate treatment of the states.  Id.  To justify a departure from the fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty among the states, Congress must demonstrate that the “statute’s disparate 
geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”  Id.  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, that smaller districts had the ability to “bail 
out” and no longer be subject to preclearance requirements.  Id. at 211. 
167 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
168 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of the Voting Rights Act, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2013) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-
ruling.html?pagewanted=all. 
169 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
170 Id. at 2631. 
171 Id. at 2621.  Alabama was a covered jurisdiction since the VRA’s original enactment.  
See Shelby I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 432. 
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declaratory judgment and permanent injunction that Sections 4(b) and 
5 of the VRA are unconstitutional.172  The district court upheld the 
VRA because it found that Congress had sufficient evidence to reau-
thorize the VRA in 2006.173  In affirming, the Court of Appeals held 
that Congress documented sufficiently widespread and persistent ra-
cial discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions.174  Shortly after, 
Shelby County filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare Sections 4(b) 
and 5 of the VRA unconstitutional.175 
2. Majority Opinion in Shelby 
During the hearings for the 2006 VRA reauthorization, the 
statistics Congress relied on ignored current developments and kept 
“the focus on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, ra-
ther than current data reflecting current needs.”176  The majority criti-
cized Congress’s conclusion that the VRA was still necessary in 2006 
and questioned the reauthorization on various bases.  First, current 
statistics showed that voter discrimination had been significantly im-
proved since 1965.177  When the VRA was passed in 1965, it was in 
response to intentional discrimination.  However, in 2013, 
“[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees [were] ra-
re.”178  When the VRA was first enacted, “the States could be divided 
into two groups: those with a recent history of voting tests and lower 
 
172 Shelby II, 133. S.Ct. at 2621-22. 
173 Id. at 2622. 
174 Shelby I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
175 Shelby II, 133. S. Ct. at 2621-22. 
176 Id. at 2629. 
177 Id. at 2626. Current data demonstrated that African American voter turnout exceeded 
white voter turnout in five of the six states originally covered by Section 5 and the gap in the 
sixth state was less than one half of one percent.  Id.; see also Reported Voting and Registra-
tion by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2012) (Table 
4b), available at https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/ 
tables.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  Prior to the VRA’s enactment in 1965, white voter 
registration exceeded black voter registration, ranging from 22.8% in Virginia to 63.2% in 
Mississippi.  Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2626.  White voter registration exceeded black voter 
registration in the following States: South Carolina = 38.4%, Georgia = 35.2%, Louisiana = 
48.9%, and Alabama = 49.9%.  Id.  In 2006, the gap between white and black voter registra-
tion was down to 12% in Virginia and black voter registration exceeded white voter registra-
tion in Mississippi by 3.8%.  Id.  South Carolina = 3.3%, Georgia = -0.7%, Louisiana = 
4.0%, and Alabama = 0.9%.  Id. 
178 Id. at 2621. 
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voter registration and turnout, and those [States] without those char-
acteristics.”179  The majority held that the VRA continued to treat 
covered jurisdictions as if the division amongst the states still existed, 
when it had not for over forty years.180 
The majority also criticized the VRA’s lengthened exten-
sion.181  During the first reauthorization, the VRA was only extended 
for five years.182  In 2006, Congress reauthorized it for twenty-five 
years.183  The VRA has always been recognized as a piece of legisla-
tion that was “far from ordinary.”184  It is only appropriate to keep an 
extraordinary piece of legislation when “exceptional”185 and 
“unique”186 conditions that called for the legislation continue to exist.  
Therefore, extending the VRA for an additional 25 years ran the risk 
of it becoming unconstitutional because the unusual circumstance 
could cease to exist long before the statute’s expiration date. 
Lastly, the majority criticized Congress’s decision to expand 
the definition of voting changes that required preclearance.187  In 
2006, the VRA was amended to include “any voting law ‘that has the 
purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any 
citizens of the United States,’ on account of race, color, or language 
minority status, ‘to elect their preferred candidates of choice.’ ”188  
This last issue troubled the majority of the Supreme Court because 
the previous interpretation of the VRA was whether the proposed 
change would have the “purpose or effect of worsening the position 
of minority groups,” while the new test covered any voting change.189  
In light of the significant improvements across the country, “the bar 
that covered jurisdictions must clear [had] been raised even as the 
conditions justifying that requirement [were] dramatically im-
proved.”190 
 
179 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2628. 
180 Id. at 2630-31. 
181 Id. at 2618. 
182 Id. at 2620. 
183 Fannie Lou Hamer Amendment, Pub. L. 109-246 § 1, 120 Stat. 577; Shelby II, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2621. 
184 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2630. 
185 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334-35. 
186 Id. 
187 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2627. 
188 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
189 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2626. 
190 Id. at 2627. 
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Considering all of these factors, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress ignored the covered jurisdictions’ improvements when it 
reauthorized the VRA until 2031.191  Furthermore, it was inappropri-
ate for Congress to single out jurisdictions based on forty-year old 
facts that had “no logical relation to the present day.”192  The Su-
preme Court held that Congress could have updated the coverage 
formula in 2006 to make it constitutional for the times; however, 
Congress failed to exercise this right and therefore the VRA was un-
constitutional in 2013.193 
3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent in Shelby 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan dissented in a lengthy opinion.194  Justice Ginsburg stated that 
it was not the job of the Supreme Court, but rather the job of Con-
gress, to determine whether the VRA remained a necessary piece of 
legislation to prevent voting discrimination against minorities.195  She 
recognized that Congress made two findings when it determined that 
the VRA should be reauthorized in 2006.196  First, reauthorizing the 
VRA would help complete the process of decreased discrimination.197  
Second, reauthorizing the VRA would prevent “backsliding.”198 
a. First and Second-Generation 
Barriers to Voting 
Although first-generation barriers were significantly dimin-
ished following the passage of the VRA, second generation barriers 
 
191 Id. at 2629. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 2631. 
194 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2632-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
195 Id. at 2632-33. 
196 Id. at 2632. 
197 Id.  The essence of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is that the VRA should have remained a 
key piece of legislation until “all vestiges of discrimination against” minority voters disap-
peared.  Id. at 2634.  She stated that the majority dismissed the debate when it “[struck] at 
the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights legislation.”  Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 
2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
198 Id. at 2632.  Justice Ginsburg and the other dissenting justices believed that without the 
VRA, the states would employ voting devices and barriers that would cause discrimination 
to become rampant once again.  Id. at 2632-33.  In order to prevent this so-called “backslid-
ing,” they believed the VRA was still necessary.  Id. 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/16
2015 THE PEOPLE OR THE STATES 963 
 
were a vestige of discrimination that still existed.  First-generation 
barriers are defined as “direct attempts to block access to the bal-
lot.”199  These tactics were most often used prior to the enactment of 
the VRA.200  Second-generation barriers, like first-generation barri-
ers, come in different forms.  However, second-generation barriers 
are “[e]fforts to reduce the impact of minority votes,”201 which typi-
cally occur indirectly.202  One example of a second-generation barrier 
is racial gerrymandering – defined as the “redrawing of legislative 
districts in an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting.”203 
In July 2011, the state of Texas filed a complaint in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that its redistricting plan complied with Section 5 
of the VRA.204  The United States District Court, in Texas v. United 
States,205 considered the effect of the new redistricting plan on minor-
ity voters and found that the plan violated Section 5 of the VRA.206  
This was a quintessential example of the second-generation barrier 
known as racial gerrymandering.207  Considering the facts, the Dis-
trict Court held that the redistricting plan had the purpose or “effect 
 
199 Id. at 2634. 
200 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (majority opinion).  Examples of first-generation barriers 
include grandfather clauses, the White Primary, and poll taxes. 
201 Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. at 2635 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993)). 
203 Id. 
204 Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (2012). 
205 Id. at 139 (denying Texas preclearance). 
206 Id. at 153. 
207 Liptak, supra note 168.  In Texas, the jurisdictions affected by the new redistricting 
plan were voting districts known as crossover districts and coalition districts.  A crossover 
district is where “a minority group ‘is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with 
help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to support the minori-
ty’s preferred candidate.’ ”  See Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (quoting Bartlett v. Strickland, 
556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009)).  A coalition district is where “two minority groups form a coalition 
to elect the candidate of the coalition’s choice.”  Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13.  African American 
and Hispanic voters in the crossover and coalition districts made up 39.3% of the Citizen 
Voting Age Population (“CVAP”) in Texas when the case was decided.  Texas, 887 F. Supp. 
2d. at 158.  Between the years 2000-2010, Texas gained 4.3 million new residents.   See also 
Ari Berman, Federal Court Blocks Discriminatory Texas Redistricting Plan, THE NATION 
(Aug. 28, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/169602/federal-court-blocks-
discriminatory-texas-redistricting-plan#.  Approximately 90% of the new citizens were mi-
norities.  Id.  65% were Hispanic; 13% African American; and 10% Asian.  Id.  As a result 
of this increase in population, Texas gained four new Congressional seats.  Id.  However, 
under the new redistricting plan, minorities were blocked from obtaining 3 out of the four 
new seats available.  Id. 
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of abridging minority voting rights . . .”208  The case was appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court.209  On June 27, 2013, it was vacat-
ed and remanded to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia because of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby.210  
The dissenting Justices in Shelby feared that without Section 4(b) of 
the VRA, racial gerrymandering, and the minority voter dilution that 
was prevented in Texas, would become rampant once again.211  The 
dissent also wrote that the VRA had enormous success in significant-
ly diminishing first-generation barriers to voting; however, second-
generation barriers “constructed to prevent minority voters from fully 
participating in the electoral process”212 still existed. 
b. Congress’s Findings Show the 
Continued Need for the Voting 
Rights Act 
Not only did the dissent note that second-generation barriers 
continued to exist at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, but 
the dissent also recognized that the majority writing for the Court 
failed to acknowledge that under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, the Court is required to grant “substantial deference”213 
to Congress’s findings.214  Therefore, the dissent disagreed with the 
majority of the Court when the majority failed to grant substantial 
deference to Congress’s findings that constitutional text and prece-
dent required.215  The dissent wrote that the majority failed to grant 
 
208 Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 166. 
209 Texas v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013). 
210 Id. at 2885. 
211 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
212 Id. at 2636. 
213 Id. 
214 The explicit language of the Fifteenth Amendment states that Congress has the power 
to enforce the Amendment “by appropriate legislation.”  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.  
“By appropriate legislation” meant that Congress could use “all means which [were] appro-
priate, which [were] plainly adapted to that end, which [were] not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 
(1819). 
215 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  When granting the substan-
tial deference that is appropriate, the Supreme Court looks at “whether Congress has ration-
ally selected means appropriate to a legitimate end.”  Id. at 2637.  Congress, when employ-
ing the legislation it found appropriate, needed only to believe that there was some basis for 
it to “resolve the conflict as it did.”  Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). 
26
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Congress the appropriate deference because the majority replaced its 
own judgment for that of Congress.216 
c. Recent Case Law Showed the 
Continued Need for the Voting 
Rights Act 
Justice Ginsburg also criticized the majority’s opinion when it 
held that the Section 4 coverage formula was not justified by current 
needs, even in a place like Alabama, where the litigation occurred.217  
The Supreme Court “confronted purposeful racial discrimination in 
Alabama” between the 1982 and 2006 reauthorizations.218  The first 
case, Hunter v. Underwood,219 was decided in 1985.220  Two years 
later, the second case, Pleasant Grove v. United States,221 was decid-
ed.  Both Hunter and Pleasant Grove involved actions where political 
subdivisions of Alabama intentionally made voting changes with the 
purpose of discriminating against African Americans to minimize 
their voting strength.222 
In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern Di-
vision of Alabama decided United States v. McGregor.223  This case 
involved state legislators who cooperated with the FBI by wearing 
 
216 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  When the VRA was up for its 
fourth reauthorization in 2006, Congress considered “empirical data from studies, personal 
accounts provided by citizens, findings of discrimination presented by litigations, and analy-
sis presented by scholars.”  See also Clarke, supra note 147 at 432.  The House Committee, 
which considered the evidence to determine if the VRA should be reauthorized, found that 
“despite substantial progress that [was] made, the evidence before the Committee [resem-
bled] the evidence before Congress in 1965 and the evidence that was present again in 1970, 
1975, 1983, and 1992.”  See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6 (2006) (Conf. Rep.).  “In 2006, the 
Committee [found] abundant evidentiary support for reauthorization of the VRA’s temporary 
provisions.” Id.  The dissent stated that so long as Congress believed the VRA was still nec-
essary, it should be upheld.  See also Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2638, 2645. 
217 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
218 Id. 
219 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
220 Id. 
221 479 U.S. 462 (1987). 
222 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In Hunter, the Supreme Court 
struck down a provision of the Alabama constitution that barred people from voting within 
the state if they were convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.  Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223, 233.  
In Pleasant Grove, the Supreme Court held that the annexation of additional acreage to a 
voting district, with a long history of discrimination, was not allowed because the change 
would have a discriminatory effect on black voters in the district.  479 U.S. at 471-72. 
223 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 
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recording devices.224  The recordings caught state legislators and oth-
er politicians discussing their plan to quash a referendum that would 
have increased African American voter turnout in Alabama.225  The 
conversations also revealed members of the state legislature using de-
rogatory terms to refer to African American voters.226  The dissent, 
looking at the recent Alabama decisions in Hunter, Pleasant Grove, 
and McGregor could not agree with the majority when it held that the 
VRA was unconstitutional as applied to Alabama,227 a state where 
“racist sentiments  . . . [remained] regrettably entrenched in the high 
echelons of state government.”228 
V. THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
In Shelby, the Supreme Court struck down Section 4(b) of the 
VRA because it unconstitutionally subjected states and political sub-
divisions to federal preclearance.229  However, the majority of the 
Court recognized there was a continued need for voting rights legisla-
tion, specifically one that was based on current data and appropriate 
for the current times.230  Therefore, the majority held that Congress 
could draft a new coverage formula.231  The Supreme Court also held 
that Congress could have redrafted the VRA when it was reauthor-
ized in 2006; however, because Congress failed to do so, the Su-
preme Court was left “with no [other] choice [than] to declare Sec-
tion 4(b) unconstitutional.”232  The Supreme Court did not strike 
down the other parts of the VRA.233  As a result, Section 5 is inappli-
cable because in order for a state or political subdivision to be subject 
to Section 5, it must first be shown that it is subject to Section 4(b)—
without Section 4(b), this progression is impossible.234  Following the 
Supreme Court’s decision, many political commentators stated that 
 
224 Id. at 1344. 
225 Id. at 1345-46. 
226 Id. 
227 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
228 McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. 
229 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Liptak, supra note 168. 
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Section 3, a portion of the VRA that remains constitutional, provided 
an alternative place where injured plaintiffs could bring their 
claims.235 
A. Congress’s Proposed Sensenbrenner-Conyers-
Leahy Bill to Replace Section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were nine states in whole and 
six other states in part that were covered jurisdictions subject to pre-
clearance.236  Of these fifteen states, two suffered no denials of de-
claratory judgments from the government during this time period.237  
However, both were still required to obtain federal preclearance be-
fore making voting changes.238  Between 2006 and the Shelby deci-
sion in June 2013, six states were granted declaratory judgments yet 
were still required to obtain federal preclearance as well.239  There-
fore, between 1996 and 2013, eight states were required to obtain 
federal preclearance when they had no history of voting discrimina-
tion for over fifteen years.240  In 2013, the VRA was held unconstitu-
tional as applied to these states.241 
Discrimination did not subside in all covered states between 
 
235 See Jeffrey Rosen, Eric Holder’s Suit Against Texas Gives the Supreme Court a 
Chance to Gut Even More of the Voting Rights Act, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114524/eric-holder-texas-suit-supreme-court-might-gut-
more-voting-rights. 
236 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice. 
gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sec_4.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia were covered in whole; 
parts of California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Michigan were 
covered.  Id. 
237 Alaska and Michigan did not suffer any denials of declaratory judgments from the 
government.  Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Alaska, Arizona, Virginia, California, Florida, and New York were granted declaratory 
judgments yet still required to obtain federal preclearance.  Id. 
240 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 236. 
241 See Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (holding that the coverage formula Congress utilizes 
must apply current data to current times).  Following Congress’s 2006 reauthorization, ap-
proximately thirty-one towns, cities, and counties in Virginia successfully bailed out of cov-
erage.  Id.  Four districts in California, two districts in Texas, one city in North Carolina, and 
one city in Alabama also successfully bailed out of coverage when they were able to show 
that they proposed no voting changes that would have a retrogressive effect on the ability of 
minority voters.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 236. 
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1996 and 2013.242  Between 1996 and 2006, the government denied 
fifteen of Louisiana’s proposed voting changes, eleven of South Car-
olina’s, and eight of Texas’s, to name a few with the most govern-
ment objections.243  Following the 2006 reauthorization, up until to 
the decision in Shelby, the government denied eleven proposed 
changes in Texas, six proposed changes in Georgia, and four pro-
posed changes in Mississippi.244  This evidence is sufficient to show 
that these states should still be required to obtain federal preclearance 
before enacting voting changes.  Section 4(b) did not recognize that 
some states had clean records for a period of over fifteen years; in-
stead, Section 4(b) still subjected these states to the VRA.  Section 
4(b) could not constitutionally subject all of these States to the feder-
al preclearance requirement.245  The holding in Shelby left open the 
option to redraft a constitutional formula that would apply to the 
states with continued records of discrimination.  In response, Con-
gress proposed the five-part Sensenbrenner-Conyers-Leahy Bill.246 
The first part of the bill creates a new Section 4 formula.  Un-
der the proposal, the entire state would be required to obtain federal 
preclearance if there were five or more violations in the past fifteen 
years, with at least one violation being made by the state.247  This 
formula is unlikely to stand a constitutional challenge because it does 
not take into consideration the progress that a state may have made as 
a whole over the past fifteen years.248  Thus, this formula is likely to 
 
242 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2619. 
243 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 236.  The government also denied proposed 
changes in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, Virginia, California, Florida, New York, 
North Carolina, and South Dakota. 
244 Id.  The government also denied proposed changes in Alabama, Louisiana, South 
Carolina, Texas, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Michigan. 
245 Shelby II, 133 S.Ct. at 2618-31.  The majority of the Supreme Court held that Congress 
no longer had the power to subject states with no recent history of discrimination under fed-
eral preclearance.   Id. 
246 Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014).  
This Act is commonly known as the Sensenbrenner-Conyers-Leahy Bill or sometimes just 
the Sensenbrenner-Conyers Bill [hereinafter Sensenbrenner Bill].   
247 Id.  A political subdivision of the state would be required to obtain federal preclearance 
if: (a) there was three or more voting rights violations in the subdivision over the past fifteen 
years; or (b) one or more voting rights violations occurred in the subdivision and the subdi-
vision had “persistent, extremely low minority turnout during the previous [15] calendar 
years.”  Id. 
248 If one area within the state has a history of voting discrimination, every political sub-
division of the state would be required to obtain federal preclearance before enacting any 
voting changes—even those who have no history of voting discrimination.  See Voting 
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be struck down for the same reasons the Supreme Court struck down 
Section 4(b) in Shelby. 
Second, the bill would require all fifty states, regardless of 
whether or not they have a history of discrimination within the past 
fifteen years, to provide notice in both local media outlets and online 
of “any change in any prerequisite to voting . . . in any election for 
Federal office that will result in the prerequisite standard, practice, or 
procedure being different from that which was in effect as of 180 
days before the date of the election.”249  The purpose of this provision 
is to promote transparency to allow voters to “identify potentially 
harmful voting changes in the forty-six states not subject to sections 4 
and 5.”250  This requirement is counterproductive because the forty-
six states that have not discriminated against minority voters are un-
likely to begin discriminating simply because Section 4(b) no longer 
stands; it is more likely that they will continue to act as they have 
been.251  Furthermore, of the four states that would be covered under 
the new proposed coverage formula, the online publication of any 
voting change is likely to confuse voters because voters are unlikely 
to scroll through thousands of pages in order to determine whether a 
voting change may be discriminatory.  The Supreme Court would 
likely strike down this proposal as well because every county, city, 
and town in every state would be required to publish any voting 
change.  This requirement is overly broad because a voting change 
may have absolutely nothing to do with a covered class, yet still re-
quires publication in newspapers and online. 
Third, the bill proposes that the Attorney General could use 
his judgment to send federal observers to states with a history of dis-
criminating against language minority groups, which would include 
 
Rights Rewind, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2014, 12:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304757004579334914053577606.  For example, “Demerits against four 
counties in Texas would land a state with 250 counties and more than a thousand cities, in-
cluding diverse metropolitan areas . . . back in the penalty box.”  Id. 
249 Sensenbrenner Bill, supra note 246 at SECTION 4 (emphasis added).  The bill would 
further require the state to provide a “concise description” of the change to certain media 
outlets.  Id. 
250 Ari Berman, Members of Congress Introduce a New Fix for the Voting Rights Act, THE 
NATION (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/177962/members-
congress-introduce-new-fix-voting-rights-act. 
251 See generally Voting Rights Rewind, supra note 248.  Therefore, they will not be pub-
lishing any information related to discriminatory voting changes because they simply are not 
proposing discriminatory voting changes.  Id. 
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twenty-five states.252  The 2006 reauthorization of the VRA required 
that the Attorney General consider various factors253 to determine 
whether he thought observers were necessary.  Under the proposed 
Sensenbrenner Bill, it is unclear what factors the Attorney General 
must take into consideration when making this determination.254  
Similar to the other provisions of the proposed bill, the Supreme 
Court would likely strike this provision down because the Attorney 
General has the ability to place federal observers in jurisdictions that 
are not covered by the VRA.255 
Fourth, the bill would eliminate the plaintiff’s burden under 
Section 4 in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.256  Under the 
proposal, the court would apply a balancing test to determine whether 
“the hardship imposed on the defendant by the issuance of the relief 
will be less than the hardship which would be imposed upon the 
plaintiff if the relief were not granted.”257  If the burden on the plain-
tiff is greater, the preliminary injunction will be granted.258 
Lastly, the bill would change Section 3 of the VRA.  Current-
ly under Section 3, a plaintiff must show that the state’s proposed 
voting change was a result of intentional discrimination.259  If the 
plaintiff is able to show that the state intentionally discriminated, the 
state is “bailed in” and required to obtain federal preclearance before 
making any voting changes.260  Under the Sensenbrenner Bill, Sec-
tion 3 would “bail in” a state regardless of whether the state inten-
tionally discriminated; any violation of the VRA would require the 
state to obtain federal preclearance before instituting voting chang-
 
252 Sensenbrenner Bill, supra note 246, at SECTION 5. 
253 Fannie Lou Hamer Amendment, supra note 183, at SECTION 3.  The attorney general 
would consider the ratio of nonwhite persons to white persons registered to vote, and wheth-
er or not the state has made bona fide efforts to comply with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.  Id. 
254 Sensenbrenner Bill, supra note 246, at SECTION 5. 
255 It is possible, although unclear how likely, that a state may have no history of discrim-
ination, proposed no voting changes, but the Attorney General felt as though federal observ-
ers should be placed within the state.  The bill gives the Attorney General full authority to do 
this.  See Sensenbrenner Bill, supra note 246 , at SECTION 5. 
256 Sensenbrenner Bill, supra note 246, at SECTION 6. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012). 
260 Sensenbrenner Bill, supra note 246, at SECTION 7. 
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es.261  The proposed bill expands the definition of a “voting rights vi-
olation” to include a proposal by the state to change its voting proce-
dures followed by a denial by the government to approve the pro-
posed change.262  Following the decision in Shelby, Section 3 
remained constitutional.263  The proposed changes to Section 3 are 
unlikely to survive a constitutional challenge because no state would 
ever propose a voting change out of fear that the proposal would be 
denied.  The government’s denial of the declaratory judgment would 
then be counted toward the number of violations a state may have 
under the proposed Section 4 formula.264 
B. Section 3 Litigation 
Although the proposed amendment to Section 3 in the 
Sensenbrenner Bill may not stand a constitutional challenge, Section 
3, in its current form, may allow plaintiffs to obtain favorable judg-
ments.265  If Section 3 is properly interpreted and applied by the 
courts, it may be a sufficient replacement for Section 4.266  Successful 
 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at SECTION 3(b)(3)(C). 
263 Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 2631. Voting Rights Act After the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Shelby County, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg81983/pdf/CHRG-113hhr 
g81983.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
264 Berman, supra note 250. 
265 In January 2014, the United States District Court for the Southern Division of Alabama 
struck down an Alabama redistricting plan under Section 3 in Allen v. City of Evergreen, No. 
13-107-CG-M, 2013 WL 1163886 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2013).  The district court relied on 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977).  Arlington held that when a plaintiff challenges a state law, the plaintiff does not 
need to prove that racial discrimination was the legislature’s “ ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ ” 
purpose in enacting the law; but rather, racial discrimination was a motivating factor.  To 
determine the legislature’s purpose in enacting the law, the court will look at legislative his-
tory.  Id. at 268.  In Arlington, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that a discrim-
inatory purpose was a motivating factor in enacting the law and thus upheld the law.  Id. at 
270.  In Allen, the court extended Arlington’s holding to apply to Section 3 challenges to vot-
ing laws.  Allen, 2013 WL 1163886, at *1.  In Allen, the district court held that the redistrict-
ing plan was evidence of gerrymandering to keep whites as the majority of the council in a 
city that was 62% black.  Id.  The district court further held that the City would be required 
to obtain federal preclearance before making changes to its voting laws.  See also Richard 
Winger, U.S. District Court in Alabama Makes Rare Use of Section 3 of the Voting Rights 
Act, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Jan 15. 2014), http://www.ballot-access.org/2014/01/u-s-
district-court-in-alabama-makes-rare-use-of-section-3-of-the-voting-rights-act/.  The district 
court further held that the City would be required to obtain federal preclearance before mak-
ing changes to its voting laws. 
266 There is a question whether the evidence in Allen supports the district court’s finding.  
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Section 3 challenges would allow the court to place jurisdictions that 
have intentionally discriminated against minority voters back on the 
preclearance list.267  This avoids all of the problems that the majority 
in Shelby found with Section 4.268  Section 3 has not been widely 
used since its enactment, but it has been proven successful.269  It is 
likely that as Section 3 challenges become more voluminous, the 
courts will lax the burden on plaintiffs since Sections 4 safeguards no 
longer exist.270 
Under Section 5 litigation, the legislature has been called up-
on to determine what percentage of challenges involved laws that 
were enacted with a discriminatory purpose or discriminatory intent 
 
Section 3 explicitly requires that the court find that the legislature intentionally discriminated 
in order to require the jurisdiction to obtain federal preclearance.  42 U.S.C. 1973a(c).  The 
district court in Allen cited no facts to show that the legislature adopted the redistricting plan 
with the purpose of discriminating against minorities.  Allen, 2013 WL 1163886.  Although 
the redistricting plan moved minority voters into fewer districts, there was no evidence in the 
court’s opinion that showed that the purpose of the plan was to intentionally discriminate.  
Id. at *1.  It is possible that the redistricting plan was adopted with the purpose of intention-
ally discriminating against minority voters, but Section 3 requires more than a mere possibil-
ity that the law was adopted with a discriminatory purpose or has a discriminatory effect. 
267 Crum, supra note 120, at 2006. 
268 The majority struck down Section 4 for three main reasons.  Shelby II, 133 S. Ct. at 
2619-28.  First, statistics showed that voter discrimination had been significantly improved 
since the VRA was adopted in 1965.  Id. at 2619.  Second, the VRA was initially enacted as 
a temporary solution and was not meant to be extended.  Id. at 2620.  Lastly, the VRA was 
expanded to require federal preclearance for any voting law rather than discriminatory voting 
laws.  Id. at 2627.  Under Section 3, the only jurisdictions that will be required to obtain pre-
clearance are those jurisdictions that continue to discriminate against their minority voters.  
See 42 U.S.C. 1973a(c).  The majority’s concern will be rectified regarding its concern that 
Section 4 was over-inclusive because it subjected states with no recent history of voting dis-
crimination under federal preclearance.  Section 3 will also resolve the majority’s concern 
that Section 4 could be extended indefinitely because Section 3 preclearance allows covered 
jurisdiction to bail out.  Section 3 diminishes, although does not completely eradicate, the 
majority’s concern that the formula set forth in Section 4 required all voting changes to be 
precleared.  Under Section 3, if a plaintiff proves that a jurisdiction intentionally discrimi-
nated, all changes to its voting laws will require preclearance.  However, only those jurisdic-
tions that have a continued pattern of discrimination need to obtain preclearance under Sec-
tion 3.  Therefore, states that have refrained from discriminating may pass any voting law 
without obtaining federal preclearance.  It is only once that law is challenged because of its 
discriminatory purpose and effect that the jurisdiction needs to obtain preclearance going 
forward. 
269 See Crum, supra note 120, at 1997-99 for an analysis on jurisdictions that were bailed 
in utilizing Section 3 of the VRA. 
270 Abby Rapoport, Get to Know Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, THE AM. PROSPECT 
(Aug. 19, 2013), available at http://prospect.org/article/get-know-section-3-voting-rights-act.  
There is evidence that this has already begun, as seen in Allen. 
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or a combination of the two.271  The legislature found that as of the 
1990s, 43% of all Section 5 objections were based on intent alone 
and an additional 31% were based on intent and effect.272  The dis-
senting Justices in Shelby were concerned that jurisdictions that con-
tinued to discriminate against minority voters would now be free to 
pass any voting law they wished because federal preclearance was no 
longer required.273  However, Justice Ginsburg relied on cases whose 
laws would be unconstitutional under Section 3.274  For example, in 
United States v. McGregor,275 Alabama state legislators and politi-
cians had recorded discussions about their intent to prevent increased 
African-American voter turnout by passing a new law.276  These con-
versations would certainly satisfy Section 3’s requirement that the 
law had a discriminatory purpose and effect. 
C. Voter Identification Laws 
Some have argued that voter identification laws are the mod-
ern day tool of disenfranchisement.277  Although Section 3 appears to 
be the most effective alternative to Section 4 litigation, plaintiffs may 
also consider bringing their claims under their state constitutions 
post-Shelby.  Voters have already challenged newly enacted voter 
identification requirements under their state constitutions.278  A com-
plicating factor in bringing a claim under the state constitution is that 
state constitutions vary and “the relevance of [a] ruling to other voter 
ID challenges is somewhat limited . . . [and] the findings on imple-
mentation are state specific and don’t really carry over to other 
states.”279 
 
271 Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
272 Id. 
273 Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
274 Id. at 2640-41. 
275 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 
276 Id. at 1345-46. 
277 The Real Cost of Voter ID Laws, VOTING RIGHTS INST., http://www.democrats.org/the-
real-cost-of-photo-id-laws (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
278 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2013 WL 184988 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014); see also City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 
2013). 
279 Sari Horwitz, Pennsylvania Judge Strikes Down Voter ID Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pennsylvania-judge-strikes-
down-voter-id-law/2014/01/17/472d620e-7fa2-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html (quot-
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1. Background 
Two classifications for voter identification laws exist.280  The 
first is “strict v. non-strict.”281  A strict classification is one that does 
not allow a voter to cast a “ballot without first presenting” identifica-
tion.282  If the voter does not have a valid ID, he may fill out a provi-
sional ballot.283  These ballots are kept separate from the regular bal-
lots.284  The provisional ballot is only counted if the voter 
subsequently provides an acceptable ID to election officials, usually 
within a few days after the election; if he fails to do so, his vote is not 
counted.285  A non-strict classification is simply one that does not re-
quire identification as a condition to cast a ballot.286  Currently, five 
states have strict photo identification laws in effect.287 
The second classification of voter identification is “photo v. 
non-photo.”288  A photo identification requirement requires the voter 
to present a valid photo identification that must meet certain require-
ments each state sets.289  A photo identification requirement may be 
either non-strict or strict.290  A non-strict photo identification re-
quirement provides voters with other options for casting a regular 
ballot.291  For example, the voter may sign an affidavit that he is who 
he says he is.292  Some states even allow poll officials to vouch for 
the individual if he knows him.293  A strict photo identification re-
quirement means that the voter must fill out a provisional ballot and 
 
ing election-law expert at University of California at Irvine, Richard L. Hasen). 
280 Voter Identification Requirements, NCSL (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/rese-
arch/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 280. 
286 Id. 
287 Id.  These states are Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee, and Texas.  Six more states 
have passed strict photo identification laws that are not yet in effect—Arkansas, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Arizona, Ohio, and Virginia cur-
rently have strict non-photo identifications in effect. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 280. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
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his vote will only be counted if he returns with valid photo identifica-
tion within a few days.294  Currently, seven states have photo identifi-
cation laws in effect.295 
2. Challenges 
Recently, voters have challenged voter identification laws that 
thirty-four states throughout the country have either enacted or pro-
posed, which will soon go into effect.296  Challenges are being 
brought under the state constitution in which the voter identification 
law has been enacted.297  In January 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court struck down a voter identification law, in Applewhite v. Com-
monwealth, because it did not “ensure liberal access”298 to the polls.  
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the right of suffrage is funda-
mental.299  Where a fundamental right is involved, a compelling 
“state interest must be demonstrated.”300  If the state shows that it has 
a compelling interest, the regulation must still be reasonable under 
the circumstances.301  To determine reasonableness, the Pennsylvania 
court asked whether the law “unnecessarily burden[ed] the franchise 
by requiring compliant photo ID.”302  The court held that Pennsylva-
nia did not have a compelling state interest because there was no evi-
dence that the photo identification requirement was passed in re-
sponse to in-person voter fraud.303  Although there was no compelling 
state interest, the court still inquired as to whether the law was nar-
rowly tailored.304  When determining whether the law was narrowly 
tailored, the court looked to the reasonableness of the regulation.305  
 
294 Id.  Currently, seven states have photo identification laws in effect.  This category in-
cludes, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and South Dakota.  
Alabama passed a photo identification law that is not yet in effect. 
295 Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 280. 
296 Id. 
297 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 2013 WL 184988; see also City of Memphis v. 
Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (2013). 
298 Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988, at *12. 
299 Id. at *19 (citing In re Nader, 858 A.2d 1167, 1181 (2004)). 
300 In re Nader, 858 A.2d 1167, 1181 (2004). 
301 Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988, at *21, 22. 
302 Id. at *19. 
303 Id. at *20-21. 
304 Id. at *21 
305 Id. at *22. 
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The court held that the law was not reasonable and therefore was not 
narrowly tailored to the governmental interest.306  The court looked to 
the statute and found that the law excluded certain forms of non-
photo identification, such as bus passes, to obtain valid photo identi-
fication.307  The statute also failed to provide an “indigent exception” 
to those who were unable to afford valid photo identification.308  
Without such an exception, the law could not stand.  Therefore, the 
court struck down the law because there was no compelling state in-
terest and the law was not narrowly tailored.309 
Four months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, in City of Memphis v. Hargett,310 upheld 
the constitutionality of a photo identification law.311  The plaintiffs 
did not have valid photo identification and were unable to cast their 
ballots.312  They brought their claim under the Tennessee State Con-
stitution.313  The plaintiffs argued that the law placed “an undue bur-
den on their right to vote” and it violated equal protection law.314  The 
court applied a strict scrutiny standard to determine if the law placed 
an undue burden on the right to vote.315  Under strict scrutiny, the de-
fendant must prove that any burden on the individual’s right to vote is 
“justified by a compelling state interest.”316  The defendant must also 
show that the regulation was “narrowly tailored to achieve the com-
 
306 Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988, at *21. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at *23-24. 
309 The petitioners also brought an equal protection claim that the court ultimately reject-
ed.  Id. at *26.  Under Pennsylvania law, an equal protection claim will prevail if the plaintiff 
can “show that a class of individuals received treatment different from other similarly-
situated individuals, and that disparate treatment is because of membership in a particular 
class.”  Id. at *24.  The court here found that the statute was facially neutral because it ap-
plied to those who needed photo identification equally.  Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988, at 
*25.  The court further held that although the voter identification law may have a dispropor-
tionate impact on particular groups (namely those who lived far from photo identification 
centers, those who had to use public transportation to get to the centers, and those who could 
not visit the centers during their limited open office hours) the impact could not be traced to 
purposeful discrimination; as a result, the equal protection claim failed.  Id. 
310 City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 2013). 
311 Id. at 111. 
312 Id. at 93-94. 
313 Id. at 94-95. 
314 Id. at 101. 
315 Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 102-03. 
316 Id. at 102. 
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pelling state interest.”317  The court held that the state’s compelling 
interest was to protect the “integrity of the election process.”318  The 
court further held that the law was narrowly tailored because “requir-
ing a person to provide a government-issued photo ID is a practical, 
narrowly tailored means for the state to guard against the risk of voter 
impersonation by ensuring that voters are who they say they are.”319 
The court distinguished Tennessee’s law from other states’ 
laws, stating that the law in question had an exception for indigent 
voters.320  The Tennessee law allowed a voter who could not afford 
the proper identification to sign an affidavit that exempted him from 
compliance.321  Considering the compelling state interest and the in-
digent exception, the court found that the law was narrowly tailored 
to protect the integrity of the election process.322 
As voter identification litigation continues, each state will 
have the burden of showing that it has a compelling state interest in 
adopting the identification law.  The state will then be required to 
show that the law is narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest.  
The courts will consider the reasonableness of the legislation and 
whether less discriminatory alternatives could have been adopted to 
achieve the same purpose.  Voter identification litigation brought un-
der state constitutions will be decided on a case-by-case, state-by-
state basis.  As seen in Applewhite and Hargett, the validity of the 
identification law may turn on whether there are exceptions for indi-
gent voters.323  The constitutionality may also depend on the interest 
the state claims to have.324  Regardless of how the issue is framed, 
 
317 Id. 
318 Id. at 103. 
319 Id. at 105-06. 
320 Memphis, 414 S.W.3d.at 106. 
321 Id. 
322 There was also an equal protection claim involved in Hargett.  The Tennessee Su-
preme Court found that the plaintiff’s equal protection claim did not meet the threshold in-
quiry of whether the classes were similarly situated within the meaning of the clause.  See 
Hargett, 414. S.W.3d at 110-11.  The court held that in-person voters and absentee voters 
were not similarly situated.  Id.  The court recognized a heightened need to adhere to legisla-
tive conditions for absentee voters because election officials cannot compare voters to their 
identification cards—in-person voters did not pose the same risk.  Id.  The court ultimately 
held that the plaintiff failed to show that absentee voters and in-person voters are similarly 
situated and denied the equal protection claim.  Id. at 111. 
323 Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988, at *23-24; Hargett, 414 S.W.3d at 110-11. 
324 Preventing voter fraud may be legitimate in some instances.  See Memphis, 414 
S.W.3d at 103-04 (holding that the state does not have to show that actual voter fraud existed 
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voter identification laws will be hard to block now that Section 4 no 
longer exists.  Voter identification laws may also be harder to over-
turn if some state courts are more willing to recognize a compelling 
state interest and find that the law is narrowly tailored to that interest.  
As the litigation continues, plaintiffs may find that voter identifica-
tion claims are better off being brought in federal court under Section 
3 of the VRA.325  These claims will only be successful if the plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the state legislature enacted the law with a dis-
criminatory purpose and the law has a discriminatory effect.326 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The perceived loss of protection due to the elimination of Sec-
tion 4(b) can be brought under the protections covered by Section 3.  
Successful Section 3 challenges will place jurisdictions that inten-
tionally discriminated back under federal preclearance before institut-
ing voting changes going forward.  Section 3 avoids the problems 
that Section 4(b) faced when the Supreme Court struck it down.  In 
applying Section 3, the courts must ensure that they require plaintiffs 
to satisfy the high burden that the statute requires.  Section 3 requires 
the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination.  However, there is 
already case law that requires the plaintiff to show less than intent to 
discriminate.  If the courts continue to hold that the jurisdiction inten-
tionally discriminated when there is not sufficient evidence to support 
that allegation, the Supreme Court may strike Section 3 down. 
Another option is for Congress to draft a new coverage for-
mula to replace Section 4(b).  However, the Sensenbrenner Bill as 
proposed will not stand a constitutional challenge.  The Bill is stricter 
than Section 4(b) and places many new requirements on the states.  
Congress must draft a bill that uses data from the previous five years 
and place only those jurisdictions that have discriminated during that 
time period under federal preclearance.  The Supreme Court is not 
likely to uphold a formula that was as over-inclusive as Section 4(b) 
was in 2013. 
Plaintiffs challenging their states voter identification laws 
may consider bringing their claims under their state constitutions.  In 
 
in order to enact laws that “protect the integrity of the election process”). 
325 The non-binding nature of state-to-state litigation may lead to too much uncertainty. 
326 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). 
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2014, a Pennsylvania state court struck down a voter identification 
law because it failed to provide an exception for indigent voters.  
Other similar statutes may be struck down for the same reason.  The 
litigation thus far shows that plaintiffs will prevail when their states’ 
law does not make an exception for indigent voters.  State constitu-
tional challenges are not ideal because a successful suit in one state is 
not binding upon any other state. 
Although the VRA was once a key piece of legislation neces-
sary to prevent voting discrimination and disenfranchisement against 
African Americans, it had outrun its usefulness by 2013.  It could not 
be said that an “exceptional condition” still existed to justify Con-
gress’ authority to legislate pursuant to voting discrimination because 
many of the covered jurisdictions had not engaged in voting discrim-
ination in decades.  Jurisdictions which recently or currently discrim-
inate against their voters should be required to submit proposed plans 
to Congress before enacting voting changes that will disenfranchise 
their voters; however, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to sub-
ject jurisdictions that do not discriminate to obtain federal preclear-
ance before enacting voting changes. 
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